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Abstract
This paper uses a natural ﬁeld experiment to better understand why individuals
tend to select items at the top of lists. After randomizing the order in which new
economics research papers are presented in email alerts and measuring the subsequent
downloads, we provide robust evidence of position eﬀects. Moreover, our novel user-
level data oﬀers two key ﬁndings: i) most users exhibit both top and bottom position
eﬀects, and ii) distinct groups of users consider the listed items in diﬀerent orders.
These results allow us to conclude that the causes of top position eﬀects are complex
and heterogeneous across individuals, but are most consistent with a version of choice
fatigue where users consider the listed items in a non-monotonic order.
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1 Introduction
When investigating search results, choosing products from websites, considering job listings,
or using a comparison site, individuals frequently make choices from lists. It is well known
that when faced with such lists, individuals often show a disproportionate tendency to select
the item in top position. This is evident from the large expenditures that ﬁrms pay for
sponsored links, the recent antitrust cases into Google's alleged bias1, and the ﬁndings from
a broad range of rigorous academic studies. For example, as later reviewed, the literature has
shown that demand increases markedly for ﬁrms at the top of search results, investors trade
more frequently with stocks at the top of investment listings, consumers are more likely to
select items at the top of menus, and voters are more inclined to choose candidates at the top
of ballots.2 However, the explanations for such choice-based `top position eﬀects' or `primacy
eﬀects' remain far less clear. Are top-placed options more likely to be selected simply because
higher quality options have been positioned at the top? If not, why might individuals show
a systematic tendency to select top- positioned items? Insights into these questions would
have a broad range of policy implications, and help understand several important market
issues regarding ﬁrms and platforms (e.g. Armstrong 2017).
However, when analyzing top position eﬀects, researchers face a methodological trade-
oﬀ. Standard ﬁeld data oﬀers high external validity but often suﬀers from an identiﬁcation
problem because the order of items is normally endogenous, and potentially further com-
plicated by the presence of price setting incentives. Alternatively, experimental data can
enable easier identiﬁcation but has lower external validity. In this paper, we take a middle
ground by conducting a natural ﬁeld experiment that facilitates an exogenous item order in
a setting with no pricing incentives, while maintaining a moderate level of external validity.
In particular, this paper analyzes the causes of top position eﬀects by using a natural
1See https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/20/business/google-fine-advertising.html, accessed
23/04/19.
2Recent examples include Fedyk (2019), Ursu (2018), Feenberg et al. (2017) and Meredith and Salant
(2013).
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ﬁeld experiment with a group of subjects that should be the least likely to depart from
standard theory - economists. Economics research papers are often available on a well-
known online database, Research Papers in Economics (RePEc). Many economists choose
to be kept informed of recent additions to the database by subscribing to a free email alert
service conducted by New Economic Papers (NEP). The service regularly compiles lists of
new papers and arranges them into descending order of estimated popularity. This setting
oﬀers an excellent experimental environment because RePEc carefully records the subsequent
download activity for each item on each list. Speciﬁcally, we measure the download activity
on a control group of lists that retain their usual ordering of papers, and on a treatment
group of lists that have their papers re-arranged into a random order.
Our ﬁndings document the presence of robust position eﬀects even within the treatment
group. Moreover, by exploiting some novel dis-aggregate features of our data, we go beyond
the existing literature by showing i) how most users exhibit both top and bottom position
eﬀects at the individual level, and ii) how distinct groups of users consider the listed items
in diﬀerent orders. These ﬁndings allow us to conclude that the causes of top position eﬀects
are complex and heterogeneous across individuals, but are most consistent with a version of
choice fatigue where users consider the listed items in a non-monotonic order.
After further detailing the experiment in Section 2, Section 3 outlines our three main
explanatory hypotheses for top position eﬀects (as deﬁned where items in the top position
are signiﬁcantly more likely to be downloaded than items in other positions). Under Speciﬁc
Item Order (H1), top position eﬀects arise only because an item with a relatively high value
happens to be in top position. Under Value Signals (H2), users cannot fully assess the quality
of items but are more likely to select top-positioned items because they expect (perhaps
incorrectly) that the items are arranged in descending order of value. Under Choice Fatigue
(H3), top position eﬀects exist because users ﬁnd top-positioned items less costly to inspect
or select. This is consistent with users who i) ﬁnd it increasingly costly to consider individual
items, and ii) evaluate top-positioned items relatively early in their decision process when
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they are most fresh. We specify some diﬀerent forms of this hypothesis depending on the
exact order in which users consider the listed items, H3a-H3d. For instance, H3a predicts
top position eﬀects by suggesting that users consider the items in a strict descending order
from the top downwards.3
Section 4.1 presents our initial empirical results by investigating how list position inﬂu-
ences users' download decisions. First, as expected within the control group, items in the
top position are signiﬁcantly more likely to be downloaded. However, highly signiﬁcant top
position eﬀects are also evidenced within the treatment group despite the order of items
having been randomized. Hence, top position eﬀects cannot be solely explained by the spe-
ciﬁc order of items (H1). Nevertheless, as randomization signiﬁcantly weakens the size of
the estimated top position eﬀects by approximately 30%, H1 does oﬀer an important partial
explanation.
Second, beyond top position eﬀects, the data in both the control and treatment groups is
also characterized by some relatively smaller but strongly signiﬁcant positive eﬀects for items
in bottom position. Such `bottom position eﬀects' contradicts Value Signals (H2) and the
simple form of Choice Fatigue (H3a) because they are not consistent with users who expect
items to be arranged in descending value order or users who becoming increasingly tired
as they work sequentially down a list. This ﬁnding also rules out the possibility that top
position eﬀects exist in the data purely because NEP typically sorts the items in descending
value.
To go beyond these initial results, Sections 4.2 and 4.3 then utilize two novel user-level
features of our dataset to reveal some key results. First, we exploit the user-level aspect of
our data to conduct a set of random parameter estimates that allow the estimated position
eﬀects to vary across users. This shows that very few users exhibit position eﬀects that
monotonically increase or decrease with position. Moreover, it suggests that the documented
top and bottom position eﬀects are largely an individual-level phenomenon: 75% of users
3As later reviewed, choice fatigue was ﬁrst introduced into this literature by Augenblick and Nicholson
(2012).
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display both top and bottom position eﬀects. Second, we exploit another novel feature of our
data which records the exact time that each download was made (to the nearest second). We
use this information to recover the order in which users made their downloads in instances
where they selected multiple items from a list. Crucially, we ﬁnd evidence of two distinct
large groups of users: 40-43% of users always download their items in a strict descending
order from top down, while 52-58% of users show no systematic monotonic order. In contrast,
only 0-2% of users always download their items in a strict ascending order, and only 2-3%
of users vary between using a strict ascending or descending order.
Hence, after accounting for the important partial explanatory role of H1 (Speciﬁc Item
Order), our novel user-level results suggest that the causes of top position eﬀects are complex
and heterogeneous across individuals. Nevertheless, our ﬁndings are most consistent with
a version of choice fatigue where users consider the listed items in a non-monotonic order
(H3d). This is akin to Feenberg et al.'s (2017) explanation of `skimming' where individuals
focus on items in the prominent top and bottom positions, and is also in line with the
theoretical predictions of Fishman and Lubensky (2018). For instance, users may make
their initial download decisions from top position downwards, but then potentially return up
the list to reconsider some items that they did not download previously. Unlike our other
considered hypotheses, this favored explanation is consistent with both our ﬁndings of i) a
large group of users who download their items in a non-monotonic sequence, and ii) users
who typically display both top and bottom position eﬀects. While less strongly supported,
our results also indicate that top position eﬀects may be further accentuated by a second
group of users who exhibit a diﬀerent form of choice fatigue by always considering their items
in a strict descending order, H3a.
Previous Literature: The existence of top and bottom position eﬀects has been previously
well documented in a variety of contexts, but our paper focuses on position eﬀects in individ-
ual choice from visually presented lists.4 Moreover, in addition to carefully documenting the
4Other contexts include how individuals i) form impressions or judgments (e.g. Asch 1946), ii) evaluate
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existence of such position eﬀects, we diﬀer from much of the previous literature by testing
between diﬀerent explanations.
In reviewing the literature, we now classify studies into two settings: i) limited selection,
and ii) unlimited selection. In limited selection, individuals may only select one item (or
some other ﬁxed number of items) from a list. This is the most common setting in previous
research, but diﬀers from our `unlimited selection' setting where i) there is no inherent
constraint on the number of items an individual can select, and ii) the items are suﬃciently
non-substitutable that individuals often wish to select multiple items. In addition to our
download environment, other everyday examples of this setting include choosing articles to
read from a news aggregator, browsing amongst diﬀerent items on a website, or selecting
items from a bestsellers list.
i) Limited Selection: This setting includes many `market' studies that use data from online
search results. As search results often place the most relevant items ﬁrst, researchers must
employ some method to rule out a simple explanation of Speciﬁc Item Order (H1). To do this,
some studies use a variety of econometric techniques.5 A notable exception is Ursu (2018)
who randomizes the order of search results at an online travel agent. She quantiﬁes the eﬀects
of rankings with a consumer search model and shows that position eﬀects are signiﬁcant but
lower than typically estimated. Murphy et al. (2006) and Dayan and Bar-Hillel (2011) also
use randomization in restaurant websites and menus, respectively. Unlike the papers on
search results, they also test for, and provide evidence of, bottom position eﬀects. However,
contrary to our paper, none of these market studies focus on testing diﬀerent explanations
of position eﬀects.
Other papers show how voters tend to select the candidate placed at the top of a ballot.6
As legislation often requires ballot orders to be (quasi-) random, these results cannot be
alternatives in contests or product sampling tests (e.g. Haan et al. 2005; Biswas et al. 2010), iii) respond in
surveys (e.g. Schwarz et al. 1992) and iv) recall items in memory tasks (e.g. Tan and Ward 2000).
5For example, Ansari and Mela (2003), Narayanam and Kalyanam (2015), Baye et al. (2016a, 2016b),
De los Santos and Koulayev (2016).
6For example, Miller and Krosnick (1998), Koppell and Steen (2004), Ho and Imai (2008), Meredith and
Salant (2013).
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explained by Speciﬁc Item Order (H1). Instead, most papers jump to an explanation of
satisﬁcing (Simon 1955) where individuals make costly inspections of items sequentially
from the top downwards, and optimally stop to select an item that is suﬃciently attractive.
However, by exploiting some features of multi-winner elections, this explanation is rejected
by Meredith and Salant (2013). Augenblick and Nicholson (2012) consider a diﬀerent setting
where voters have to vote on multiple diﬀerent contests within the same ballot. Consistent
with voters depleting their cognitive resources as they work down the ballot paper, they show
that voters become more likely i) to abstain, ii) vote for the default option, or iii) display a
bias towards candidates listed ﬁrst. Augenblick and Nicholson refer to this as `choice fatigue'.
In contrast, we use some novel features of our data to analyze some speciﬁc forms of choice
fatigue as explanations for top (and bottom) position eﬀects within our alternative context.
ii) Unlimited Selection: Some evidence within this setting comes from ﬁnance. As lists of
stocks are often presented in alphabetical order, Itzkowitz et al. (2016) and Jacobs and
Hillert (2016) show that ﬁrms with earlier names have higher trading activity, while Fedyk
(2019) documents how top placed news articles at Bloomberg can lead to substantially higher
trading volumes and price changes for associated ﬁnancial assets.
Other evidence comes from academia. Pinkowitz (2002) and Coupe et al. (2010) use
clever strategies to show a partial role for Speciﬁc Item Order (H1). Pinkowitz (2002) uses
data from the Journal of Finance website where individuals can download fully published
papers as well as accepted papers that have yet to be allocated to an issue. Consistent with
H1, papers that are later allocated a top position receive signiﬁcantly more downloads before
being assigned their position. However, consistent with other explanations, such papers also
receive an additional download eﬀect after being listed ﬁrst. Alternatively, Coupe et al.
(2010) show top position eﬀects exist within issues of the European Economic Review even
when the order of papers is determined alphabetically rather than by the editor. Closest to
our research is the excellent paper by Feenberg et al. (2017) who use the random ordering
of NBER paper alerts to show top and bottom position eﬀects in individuals' download and
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citation activity. Among other results, they suggest that the most consistent explanation is
`skimming' where, similar to our H3d, time-constrained individuals focus on salient positions
such as top and bottom. In contrast, while our NEP alerts have a lower readership than
NBER alerts and are therefore less inﬂuential on citation activity, our data contains rich
dis-aggregate information on download decisions at the user-level. This allows us to employ
random parameter techniques and analyze the timing of downloads in order to i) further test
between competing hypotheses, ii) provide diﬀerent forms of evidence, and iii) better allow
for heterogeneity in explanations across users.
Finally, our paper also makes a secondary contribution to a literature on search behavior.
For instance, by using data on consumers that click on more than one online search result,
Jeziorski and Segal (2015) demonstrate that less than half of such consumers make their
clicks in a monotonic descending order. Alternatively, within a sophisticated search-theoretic
laboratory experiment, Caplin et al. (2011) provide some persuasive support for satisﬁcing
while also showing that some subjects inspect items in an ascending rather than descending
order. Within our diﬀerent setting, we also document some related patterns of behavior, but
use such evidence to analyze the causes of top position eﬀects.7
2 Setting, Experiment, and Data
2.1 RePEc and NEP
Research Papers in Economics (RePEc) is a popular online database of economics research
papers. As part of RePEc, New Economics Papers (NEP) oﬀers a free email alert service to
notify individuals about new papers that have been recently added to the RePEc database.
Such alerts are often provided on a weekly basis and are generated for separate research
subﬁelds, such as health economics or monetary economics. Subscribers can select which
7Tests of standard search theory, such as De los Santos et al. (2012), are less relevant to our paper as they
use settings without a pre-deﬁned list or search order. However, as potentially consistent with our ﬁndings,
they do ﬁnd that individuals often go back to select a previously searched option.
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subﬁelds they wish to subscribe to and NEP has over 80000 total subscriptions.8
Each email alert has two sections of text. An extract from an example alert is provided
in Section 1.1 of the Supplementary Appendix. The top section states how many papers
are included in the alert and presents a brief list of the papers with their titles and authors.
If a reader clicks on the title of any paper within the list, or scrolls down, she is taken
to the bottom section of the alert. The bottom section repeats the same list of papers
but with additional summary information including each paper's abstract, keywords, JEL
classiﬁcation codes, date (if these are available) and most importantly, a link to a full text
version of each paper. By clicking on a paper's link, a new window is opened and the paper
is downloaded.9
The alerts for each subﬁeld are managed by an editor, who is a volunteer from academia
or the public sector. Although never made explicit to subscribers, the list of papers within
each alert is compiled as follows. First, NEP gathers a master list of all new papers that have
been recently added to the RePEc database. An algorithm then uses past data together with
information about each paper's title and abstract to arrange the papers into descending order
of estimated popularity. This master list is then passed to the subﬁeld editors for them to
extract the papers that are relevant for their next subﬁeld alert. After selecting their relevant
papers, each editor is free to amend the order in which the papers are presented within their
alert or leave them in the order suggested by the algorithm. Most editors amend the order
of their lists with the intention of further improving upon the algorithm's attempts to put
the more interesting and relevant papers towards the top.
As later discussed in more detail, papers can be selected to be in the alert of more than
one subﬁeld. Therefore, to avoid confusion, we will now make a distinction between `papers'
and `items'. An item will refer to an entry on a speciﬁc alert, whereas a paper will refer to
8For more, see http://nep.repec.org/, accessed 23/04/19.
9Given the importance of bottom position eﬀects within our later analysis, one may ask whether users
are artiﬁcially drawn to the bottom item via the two-section design of the alerts. However, this is not the
case. When inspecting the summary information of the top item in the lower section of the alert, the bottom
item within the upper section of the alert is oﬀ-screen.
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the underlying piece of research that can appear as an item in multiple subﬁeld alerts. For
ease of exposition, we will also refer to `alerts' and `lists' interchangeably.
RePEc measures the download activity for each item in an extremely precise manner.
First, it measures downloads that occur speciﬁcally via the links contained within NEP
alerts, not just those that occur through RePEc more generally. Second, in cases where a
paper appears in multiple subﬁeld alerts, RePEc records the downloads within each separate
alert. Hence, the measurement of downloads is item-speciﬁc, not paper-speciﬁc, such that
the relationship between list position and subsequent download activity can be analyzed
in a meaningful manner. Finally, for each download, RePEc records the individual device
(anonymized ip address) to which the download was made, and the time at which the down-
load was initiated (to the nearest second). Thus, even when there are multiple devices being
used within the same institution, RePEc carefully records download decisions and download
timings at the level of each individual device.
2.2 Experimental Procedure
After requesting permission from NEP, we were granted access to the download data for
the alerts released over a 5-month period across 29 subﬁelds.10 Moreover, we were given
permission to manipulate the order in which the items were presented for a small proportion
of alerts. To do this, we asked NEP and the relevant editors to continue collecting and
ordering their alerts as they would do under normal circumstances. However, before the
release of any given alert, we intervened and randomly allocated the alert into one of two
groups. Within each subﬁeld, around two-thirds of the alerts were allocated to a control
group and the remaining alerts were allocated to a treatment group. Any alert within
the control group was sent to subscribers with no alterations - the list of items was left
completely unchanged. In contrast, any alert within the treatment group had its list of
10The range of subﬁelds appear representative and cover a wide range of diﬀerent areas of economics
including areas like Cognitive and Behavioural, Time Series and Post Keynesian. A full list is provided in
Section 1.2 of the Supplementary Appendix.
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items rearranged into a new random order. An identical email with the revised order was
sent to all subscribers. Beyond this, no changes were ever made to the content or presentation
of the alerts. Importantly, the subscribers were left unaware of the experiment and that some
lists were being randomized.
2.3 Data
Our analysis considers how download activity is related to four list positions within the email
alerts: top, second, second-from-bottom, and bottom. As these positions are ill-deﬁned in
lists with less than four items, we drop the 43 such alerts from our initial sample. This
leaves a ﬁnal sample of 530 alerts, including 350 alerts within the control group and 180
alerts within the treatment group.
Some summary statistics are provided in Table 1 (all tables and ﬁgures are included in
the main Appendix unless otherwise stated). Across the 530 alerts, the sample covers a total
of 6624 items with an average of 12.5 items per alert. The 6624 listed items stem from 4942
diﬀerent papers such that an average paper appears on 1.33 subﬁeld alerts within our sample
(or 3.90 subﬁeld alerts across all of NEP). We later address this feature of the data within
our estimation procedures.
Table 1 also uses NEP's item-speciﬁc download measures to record the aggregate number
of downloads made from the release date of each item's subﬁeld alert until a single cut-oﬀ
date, almost two years later. This measurement period is suﬃcient to cover all relevant
downloads as most downloads are made within a few weeks after the alert is released. How-
ever, the use of a single cut-oﬀ date does imply that alerts with diﬀerent release dates are
monitored for slightly diﬀerent lengths of time. Our analysis later controls for this.
Within the sample, downloads were made from 9364 ip addresses. To ease exposition,
we broadly refer to an ip address as a `user'. After deleting a handful of duplicative cases
whereby the same user downloaded the same item more than once, we end up with a total
of 35004 downloads.
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In subsequent sections, we often combine the download data with a range of alert-speciﬁc
and item-speciﬁc control variables. These as summarized in Table 2. The alert-speciﬁc
control variables include the total number of items within the alert and a measure of each
alert's `availability' - the number of days between the alert's release date and the ﬁnal
download cut-oﬀ date. The item-speciﬁc (or paper-speciﬁc) control variables are constructed
from each item's summary information. They include variables related to an item's title
language, title length, number of authors, abstract length, number of keywords, number of
JEL codes, and the total number of lists (within the entire population of NEP) in which the
item's underlying paper appeared.
3 Explanatory Hypotheses
We now outline our three main explanatory hypotheses for top position eﬀects, H1-H3. As a
backdrop, we conceptualize the decision environment as follows. For any given alert or `list'
l with nl ≥ 4 items, we deﬁne the position of item j as pj ∈ {1, ..., nl}, where pj = 1 if item j
is in top position, and pj = nl if item j is in bottom position. We then categorize any given
user i's value of downloading item j into three components. The ﬁrst component refers to
the `observable value'. User i can quickly and freely assess this value component from item
j's summary information, such as its title and authors. In contrast, the second component
refers to the `unobservable value'. This value component relates to the underlying quality of
the item and cannot be assessed until after user i has downloaded and read the item more
carefully. Finally, the third component refers to the `inspection value'. This value component
can be assessed before the item is downloaded but only if user i makes a costly inspection
of item j's additional summary information from the lower section of the alert, such as its
abstract.
Our three explanatory hypotheses, H1-H3, each revolve around one of the three discussed
value components. In what follows, we deﬁne top position eﬀects to exist when items in the
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top position are signiﬁcantly more likely to be downloaded than items in other positions.
H1: Speciﬁc Item Order. Top position eﬀects exist because items in the top position
have a relatively large observable value.
This rather trivial explanation suggests that top-positioned items are more likely to be
selected only because they happen to have a relatively large observable value.
H2: Value Signals. Top position eﬀects exist because users believe (perhaps incor-
rectly) that the items have been arranged in descending order of unobservable value.
In contrast, H2 suggests that top-positioned items are more likely to be downloaded
because users believe that some better informed agent has arranged the items in order of
unobservable value.
H3: Choice Fatigue. Top position eﬀects exist because users ﬁnd that top-positioned
items are less costly to inspect or select.
Under the assumption that users ﬁnd it costly to inspect and select items, H3 is built on
the ideas that users may only consider a subset of the listed items and that top-positioned
items are more likely to be in this subset because they are less costly to consider. In
particular, H3 is consistent with a user who i) exhibits total inspection/selection costs that
are convex in the number of inspections/selections they make, and ii) considers top-positioned
items earlier than other items within their decision process.11
3.1 Speciﬁc Forms of Choice Fatigue
For the later analysis, we now outline a number of speciﬁc forms of choice fatigue which
depend upon the exact order in which users consider the listed items, H3a-H3d. In addition
to top position eﬀects, some of these forms also predict the simultaneous presence of bottom
position eﬀects (where items in the bottom position are also signiﬁcantly more likely to be
downloaded than items in other positions).
11In this sense, choice fatigue is related to the idea of convex search costs (e.g. Ellison and Wolitzky 2012).
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H3a: Choice Fatigue with Descending Monotonic Direction. Top position eﬀects exist
because users consider the items in a strict descending order from top position downwards.
Assuming that users have increasing inspection/selection costs, H3a suggests that top
position eﬀects exist because users consider the items sequentially from top downwards.
Hence, items in the top position are more likely to be downloaded because they are considered
ﬁrst when users are still fresh and when inspection/selection costs are at their lowest.
H3b: Choice Fatigue with Heterogeneous Monotonic Direction. Top position eﬀects co-
exist with bottom position eﬀects because some users consider the items in a strict descending
order from top downwards while others consider the items in a strict ascending from bottom
upwards.
Under the assumption that users have increasing inspection/selection costs, H3b predicts
the simultaneous existence of top and bottom position eﬀects by recognizing the potential
heterogeneity in users' behavior. It suggests that top position eﬀects derive from a group of
users who consider the items in a descending direction, while bottom position eﬀects arise
from a diﬀerent group of users who consider the items in an ascending direction.12
H3c: Choice Fatigue with Varied Monotonic Direction. Top position eﬀects co-exist with
bottom position eﬀects because each user varies between considering the items in a strict
descending or ascending order.
Assuming that users have increasing inspection/selection costs, H3c predicts that an
individual user may display both top and bottom position eﬀects. It suggests that each user
may vary the order in which they consider a list depending on the context - a user may
employ a descending order in some lists, but an ascending order in others.
H3d: Choice Fatigue with Non-Monotonic Direction. Top position eﬀects co-exist with
bottom position eﬀects because users consider the items in a non-monotonic order.
12The possibility of users considering items from bottom position upwards may seem odd. However, such
behavior is later evidenced directly in Section 4.3.1, and is experimentally supported by Caplin et al. (2011).
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H3d is consistent with Feenberg et al.'s (2017) explanation of `skimming' where users
focus on items in prominent positions, such as top and bottom. Given increasing inspec-
tion/selection costs, one example of a non-monotonic order may involve users i) making their
initial download decisions from top position downwards, but then ii) potentially returning
up the list to reconsider some items that they did not download previously. Such users may
then display both top and bottom position eﬀects because items towards the top are initially
easier to consider, but once a user reaches the bottom, lower-placed items become relatively
less costly to consider instead.1314
4 Analysis
This section takes the presented explanatory hypotheses to the data. It is structured around
four empirical tests, I-IV, and their associated analysis.
4.1 Empirical Tests I and II
We ﬁrst consider Empirical Tests I and II in order to assess H1 (Speciﬁc Item Order), H2
(Value Signals) and H3a (Choice Fatigue with Descending Monotonic Direction).
Empirical Test I: Comparison of the Control and Treatment Groups. Reject
H1 if signiﬁcant top position eﬀects remain within the treatment group.
Intuitively, top position eﬀects under H1 (Speciﬁc Item Order) only exist because an
item with a relatively large observable value has been placed in top position. Consequently,
under H1, any such eﬀects should only arise within the control group where the items have
13Fishman and Lubensky (2018) provide some related theoretical results. By building on Janssen and
Parakhonyak (2014), they consider a limited selection setting where individuals face i) positive inspection
costs, and ii) positive return costs to reconsider previously inspected options. They show that options at
both the start and the end of a sequence are more likely to be selected.
14H3d can also be motivated from a bounded rationality perspective if users employ heuristics to economize
on cognitive resources and such heuristics exhibit top and bottom position eﬀects by making the items in
the top and the bottom position appear more salient. Salant (2011) provides some related theoretical results
within a limited selection setting to show that any heuristic that is procedurally simpler than rational choice
displays top and bottom position eﬀects.
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been deliberately ordered, and not within the treatment group where the item order has
been randomized. In contrast, any evidence of top positions within the treatment group
cannot be used to rule out the other explanations as users might still continue to i) hold
(now incorrect) beliefs that top-placed items have high value (H2), ii) ﬁnd top-positioned
less costly to consider (H3).
Empirical Test II: Analysis of Other Position Eﬀects. Reject H2 and H3a if
items in some position p, are signiﬁcantly more likely to be downloaded than items in some
preceding position, p′ < p.
This test is based on analyzing a broader set of position eﬀects beyond top position. In
particular, under H2 (Value Signals) and H3a (Choice Fatigue with Descending Monotonic
Direction), download activity is predicted to be decreasing in position because i) users expect
item values to be decreasing from top position downwards, or ii) users consider the items in
a descending direction. Hence, H2 and H3a can be rejected if there are signiﬁcant instances
where download activity is increasing in position.
4.1.1 Descriptive Results
For an initial descriptive analysis, we ﬁrst consider aggregate downloads. In particular,
Table 3 and Figure 1 show how the aggregate number of downloads per item varies with
list position within the control and treatment groups. First, as expected, there are strong
top position eﬀects in the control group: top-positioned items receive 57% more aggregate
downloads than an average item. Second, while the randomization of item order reduces
this eﬀect by around a quarter, top-positioned items still receive 42% more downloads than
average within the treatment group. Hence, with the use of Empirical Test I, Speciﬁc Item
Order (H1) oﬀers an important partial explanation of top position eﬀects, but it cannot be
the main explanation. Third, if we consider a broader set of positions while ignoring bottom
position (as often done in some parts of the existing literature), then downloads appear
to be strictly decreasing in item position. However, contrary to this pattern, across both
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the control and treatment groups, bottom-positioned items attract 22-26% more downloads
than items in the preceding, second-from-bottom, position. Moreover, this eﬀect is so large
that items in the bottom position actually receive 23% more downloads than average in the
treatment group, and even receive 9% more downloads than average in the control group
where the bottom item has the lowest predicted popularity. Using Empirical Test II, the
presence of such bottom position eﬀects contradicts Value Signals (H2) and Choice Fatigue
with Descending Monotonic Direction (H3a), and also rules out the possibility that top
position eﬀects exist in the data purely because NEP typically sorts the items in descending
value. Instead, such patterns are more consistent with the other forms of choice fatigue,
H3b-H3d.
4.1.2 Random Eﬀects Estimations
To consider Empirical Tests I and II more deeply, we now provide a more rigorous analysis
of how list position aﬀects download activity. Such an analysis could be done in several
ways. For instance, one could continue to use the aggregate download data to estimate how
list position aﬀects the total number of downloads received by each item. Alternatively, one
could investigate the data at a dis-aggregated `user' level to estimate how an active user's
decision to download an item is aﬀected by its list position. To demonstrate the robustness
of our results, we take both approaches. In the main text, we now focus on a dis-aggregate
analysis in order to i) control for unobservable user-eﬀects, and ii) provide a useful foundation
for later sections. However, we also show that the main conclusions of this subsection remain
robust under the alternative aggregate approach within Section 1.5 of the Supplementary
Appendix.
To conduct the dis-aggregate analysis, we construct a dataset of active user download
decisions. In particular, for any list l where user i has downloaded one or more items, we
construct nl user-item level observations where dipl equals one if user i downloaded the item
in position p of list l, and zero if not. For example, if a user downloaded the ﬁrst two papers
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from a list of four items, four observations would be created with values of dipl equal to
{1, 1, 0, 0} respectively. After applying this procedure over all users and all lists, we ﬁnish
with a dataset of 288,788 user-item level observations.
To understand how users' download decisions are inﬂuenced by item position, we estimate
a multi-dimensional random eﬀects (RE) probit model. In particular, to consider user i's
decision of whether to download the item in position p of list l we construct the following
propensity variable where, as usual, dipl = 1 if and only if d
∗
ipl > 0.
d∗ipl = β0 + Π
′βΠ + z′lβz + q
′
plβq + ψi + µpl + εipl. (1)
The vector Π includes a set of position dummies for items in the top, second, second-from-
bottom, and bottom positions. Any position eﬀects will then be captured by the estimated
values within βΠ = {βtop, βsec, βsecbot, βbot}. The vectors zl and qpl include the list-speciﬁc
and item-speciﬁc control variables that were presented in Section 2.3. To control for user
heterogeneity and the fact that some papers are included on more than one alert, we then
include random eﬀects at two levels. First, we include a `user random eﬀect', ψi, to capture
the unobservable eﬀects of an individual ip address. Second, we include a `paper random
eﬀect', µpl, to control for the unobservable eﬀects of the underlying paper in position p of
list l.
After estimating equation (1) on the control and treatment groups separately, we formally
examine how the estimated position eﬀects diﬀer between the control and treatment groups
by re-estimating the equation on the full sample with the following additional variables:
treatl - a dummy variable that equals one only if list l is in the treatment group, and
Π′ ∗ treatl - a vector of interacted position terms.
Table 4 presents the results (with some further technical explanation), while Figure 2
plots the estimated position eﬀects for the control and treatment groups for an example
speciﬁcation. The main results can be summarized as follows.15
15The estimated eﬀects of the control variables are presented and discussed separately in Section 1.3 of
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First, as expected within the control group, items in the top position are signiﬁcantly more
likely to be downloaded. However, highly signiﬁcant top position eﬀects also remain within
the treatment group despite the order of items having been randomized. Hence, echoing
the descriptive results, this rules out Speciﬁc Item Order (H1) as a full explanation, but
shows that H1 plays an important minor explanatory role. In particular, as randomization
signiﬁcantly weakens the size of the estimated top position eﬀects by approximately 30%, H1
appears to account for a third of the documented position eﬀects within the control group.
Second, there are smaller, yet signiﬁcant, position eﬀects for items placed in second posi-
tion and bottom position in both the control and treatment groups. Indeed, randomization
has no signiﬁcant eﬀect in reducing the size of the bottom position eﬀect. Thus, the esti-
mated position eﬀects are not strictly decreasing in size from top to bottom. Some formal
tests at the bottom of Table 4 conﬁrm that the position eﬀects are strictly decreasing from
top to second, and from second to second-from-bottom, but not from second-from-bottom
to bottom. Hence, via Empirical Test II, this rules out H2 (Value Signals) and H3a (Choice
Fatigue with Descending Monotonic Direction) as full explanations - top position eﬀects
cannot exist just because users expect items to be arranged in descending value order (H2),
or because users consider the items in descending order.
Finally, while the estimated `paper random eﬀects' are only signiﬁcant with the control
group, the reported `user random eﬀects' are heavily signiﬁcant across all cases. This implies
substantial user heterogeneity - as further explored in the remaining sections.16
4.2 Empirical Test III
Next, we introduce and evaluate Empirical Test III in order to test explanatory hypothesis
H3b (Choice Fatigue with Heterogeneous Direction). To recall, H3b predicts the simulta-
neous existence of top and bottom position eﬀects by suggesting that top position eﬀects
the Supplementary Appendix.
16Extended estimations show how the documented top position eﬀects become more pronounced in longer
lists. However, we place less weight on this part of the analysis. For details, see Section 1.4 of the Supple-
mentary Appendix.
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derive from a group of users who consider the items in a descending direction, while bottom
position eﬀects arise from a diﬀerent group of users who consider the items in an ascending
direction.
Empirical Test III: Other Position Eﬀects and User Heterogeneity. Reject
H3b if download activity is not decreasing from top position downwards for some users and
increasing from bottom position upwards for others.
Under H3b, download activity should be decreasing in position for those users who al-
ways employ a descending order, but increasing in position for those users who employ an
ascending order. In contrast, no such ﬁxed monotonic patterns are required at the user-level
under Choice Fatigue with Varied Direction (H3c) where any given user may vary the order
in which they consider a list, or under Choice Fatigue with Non-Monotonic Direction (H3d)
where users may consider the items in a non-linear order.
4.2.1 Random Parameter Estimations
Clearly, Empirical Test III hinges on how the estimated position eﬀects vary across diﬀerent
users. Hence, rather than using our previous random eﬀects model, (1), we now further
exploit our user-level data to estimate a random parameters model. As illustrated in (2),
this allows the set of estimated position eﬀects, βi,Π, to vary across each user i:
17
d∗ipl = β0 + Π
′βi,Π + z′lβz + q
′
plβq + εipl (2)
In particular, the vector of position eﬀects, βi,Π is now speciﬁed as βi,Π = β¯Π +αi,Π where
β¯Π is a vector of average coeﬃcients, and each element in the vector, αi,Π, follows a normal
distribution with a zero mean and variance to be estimated.
Table 5 presents the key results by summarizing some user-level features of the estimated
17We focus only on user heterogeneity for these estimations. Adding additional paper-level heterogeneity
to the random parameters makes little diﬀerence to the results and only complicates interpretation.
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random parameters, βi,Π = {βi,top, βi,sec, βi,secbot, βi,bot}.18 First, within the treatment group,
as initially consistent with Choice Fatigue with Heterogeneous Direction (H3b), 64% of
users are estimated to have their largest position eﬀect in top position, max{βi,Π} = βi,top,
while 16% of users are estimated to have their largest position eﬀect in bottom position,
max{βi,Π} = βi,bot. Second, however, in contrast to H3b, only one percent of users are
estimated to have position eﬀects that monotonically decrease with position, βi,top > βi,sec >
βi,secbot > βi,bot, and even fewer users are estimated to have position eﬀect that monotonically
increase with position, βi,top < βi,sec < βi,secbot < βi,bot. This suggests that H3b has a
negligible role in explaining the documented position eﬀects. It also adds to the evidence
against Value Signals (H2) or Choice Fatigue with Descending Monotonic Direction (H3a)
where we would expect all users' to exhibit decreasing position eﬀects. Finally, instead, the
results indicate that 75% of users exhibit both top and bottom position eﬀects such that
βi,top > βi,sec and βi,secbot < βi,bot. More speciﬁcally, 72% of users display a speciﬁc non-
monotonic pattern where βi,top > βi,sec > βi,secbot < βi,bot. These key results suggest that top
and bottom position eﬀects are largely an individual phenomenon as more more consistent
with Choice Fatigue with Varied Direction (H3c) or Choice Fatigue with Non-Monotonic
Direction (H3d).
4.3 Empirical Test IV
Finally, we consider Empirical Test IV to get further traction on the choice fatigue hypothe-
ses. Empirical Test IV is based upon the order in which individual users make download
decisions.
Empirical Test IV: Ordering of Multiple Downloads. Under H3b, some users
always make their downloads in a monotonic descending order, while others use a monotonic
ascending order. Whereas, each user will vary between a monotonic descending or ascending
order under H3c, or use a non-monotonic order under H3d.
18For the full estimation results, see Section 1.5 of the Supplementary Appendix.
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4.3.1 Download Timing
To implement Empirical Test IV, we make use of our unlimited selection setting and NEP's
accurate data on download timing to recover the order in which each user made their down-
loads in instances where they downloaded more than one item from a given list. We ﬁrst
assess the download ordering patterns in the aggregate user population, before further con-
sidering the extent to which individual users show systematic download ordering patterns
across diﬀerent lists.
As an initial analysis, Table 6 summarizes the download ordering patterns for all instances
where a user downloads k items from an individual list. First, let k ≥ 2. Here, there are
6370 instances where a user downloads at least two items from a list. The results show that
users download their top-most selected item ﬁrst in 76% of the instances, and download their
bottom-most selected item ﬁrst in 18% of instances. This gives clear evidence that not all
users select their items from the top down, and that some users start their selections from
the bottom.
However, to study whether users download their items in a monotonic order, it is better to
focus on instances where users download more than two items from a list. While this reduces
the sample size, it avoids including artiﬁcial instances of monotonic behavior when a user
downloads exactly two items. Hence, the right-hand side of Table 6 presents some results
for instances where users download at least three items (k ≥ 3) or four items (k ≥ 4) per
list. This shows that items are downloaded in a monotonic order 70-73% of the time: 67% of
instances exhibit a monotonic descending order, while 3-6% exhibit a monotonic ascending
order. While this is particularly in line with Choice Fatigue with Heterogeneous Direction
(H3b) or Choice Fatigue with Varied Direction (H3c), it also implies that the remaining 27-
30% of instances exhibit non-monotonic download behavior as more consistent with Choice
Fatigue with Non-Monotonic Direction (H3d). Hence, this evidence is consistent with the
presence of all three explanations, H3b-H3d.
To go deeper, we now repeat this style of analysis but consider the extent to which users
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show systematic download ordering patterns across diﬀerent lists. To do this, we analyze
the 992 users who download at least k = 2 items in more than one instance. On average, we
observe such users' multiple download behavior across 4 diﬀerent lists. Table 7 presents the
results. Overall, we see that 52% of such users `always' download their top-most selected
item ﬁrst, while 3% of such users `always' download their bottom-most selected item ﬁrst.
To examine the extent to which these `multiple download users' show systematic mono-
tonic ordering behaviors across diﬀerent lists, we now further restrict attention to users who
download at least three or four items per list (with k ≥ 3 or k ≥ 4) in more than one
instance. Table 7 indicates the following key results.
First, only 2-3% of users `always' download their items in a monotonic order with varied
directions. This suggests that Choice Fatigue with Varied Direction (H3c) has a negligible
role.
Second, only 0-2% of users always download their items in a strict ascending order.
Thus, the evidence for Choice Fatigue with Heterogeneous Direction (H3b) is also weak
as the proportion of users that employ an ascending order is insigniﬁcant from zero and
seemingly too small to account for the size of the documented bottom position eﬀects.
Instead, the download timing data provides evidence of two large groups of users that
behave in line with H3a and H3d. Consistent with Choice Fatigue with Monotonic Descend-
ing Direction (H3a), 40-43% of users always download their items in a strict descending
order. Further, consistent Choice Fatigue with Non-Monotonic Direction (H3d), 52-58% of
users show no systematic monotonic behavior. Instead, such users typically download their
selected items in a non-monotonic order 49-54% of the time, with 14-19% of users always
downloading their items in a non-monotonic order.
4.4 Summary
We now bring our ﬁndings together to summarize the paper's overall evidence on the causes of
top position eﬀects. As approximately 30% of the observed top position eﬀects are eliminated
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once the item order is randomized, H1 (Speciﬁc Item Order) does oﬀer an important partial
explanatory role. However, accounting for the remaining, more fundamental, causes is more
complex and our results suggest that a number of explanations are at play for diﬀerent groups
of users. Nevertheless, we ﬁnd that H3d (Choice Fatigue with Non-Monotonic Direction)
best ﬁts the evidence due its consistency with both i) the random parameter results where
75% of users exhibit both top and bottom position eﬀects, and ii) the download timing results
which suggest that a large group of users download their items in a non-monotonic sequence.
The other considered hypotheses have less explanatory power. Our download timing data
indicates that very few users behave in line with Choice Fatigue with Heterogeneous Direction
(H3b) or Choice Fatigue with Varied Direction (H3c), while H3b is also inconsistent with
our result that top and bottom position eﬀects are largely an individual-level phenomenon.
H2 (Value Signals) and H3a (Choice Fatigue with Descending Monotonic Direction) lack
support due to the presence of bottom position eﬀects and the non-monotonic patterns
within the random parameter results. However, the ﬁnding that a large group of users
regularly download their items in a descending order suggests that H3a may play a role in
accentuating the magnitude of top position eﬀects.
5 Conclusion
Top position eﬀects in individuals' choices from lists are an important phenomenon in many
market, ﬁnancial, and political settings. However, their cause has remained ill-understood.
To provide an opportunity to cleanly measure and assess the sources of top position eﬀects,
this paper has used a natural ﬁeld experiment capable of navigating several confounding
factors.
Among other results, we have found that i) signiﬁcant top position eﬀects remain even
when the order of items is randomized, and ii) top position eﬀects co-exist with smaller, but
highly signiﬁcant, bottom position eﬀects. Moreover, our novel user-level data has allowed
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us to show that iii) most users exhibit both top and bottom position eﬀects, rather than
just one or the other, and iv) distinct groups of users behave diﬀerently with regard to
the order in which they select multiple items. We conclude that the causes of top position
eﬀects are complex and heterogeneous across individuals. However, our ﬁndings are most
consistent with a version of choice fatigue where users consider the listed items in a non-
monotonic order. In addition, there may be an additional secondary explanation resulting
from a diﬀerent group of users who also exhibit choice fatigue but consider the items in a
strict descending order.
While we must be careful not to transfer these ﬁndings too far outside their context, our
insights should prompt future research in several broad regards. First, it would be valuable
to further understand what determines a user's inspection order and how this varies in
diﬀerent settings. Second, our insights may help analyze the potential for policy to nudge
individuals into selecting beneﬁcial options, such as more suitable savings and insurance plans
or healthier foods (e.g. Dayan and Bar-Hillel 2011). Finally, our results may also assist in
understanding a number of issues that are currently highly relevant in industrial economics
and antitrust in relation to search order and prominence. For instance, as recently reviewed
by Armstrong (2017), the causes of position eﬀects are key when analysing the extent to
which ﬁrms can manipulate consumers' choices through the presentation of their product
ranges (e.g. Petrikait
e 2018), and a variety of issues regarding the eﬀects, design, and
regulation of list-based platforms (e.g. Athey and Ellison 2011, McDevitt 2014, de Cornière
and Taylor 2014).
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Appendix: Tables and Figures
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
All Control Treatment
Number of alerts 530 350 180
Total number of items 6624 4269 2355
Average number of items per alert 12.50 12.64 12.20
Total number of downloads across items 35002 22856 12146
Average number of downloads per item 5.28 5.35 5.16
Total number of users that downloaded at least one item 9367 7024 4065
Average number of items downloaded per active user per alert 1.73 1.72 1.75
Average number of days between download and alert release 14.69 14.16 15.67
Total number of papers 4942 - -
Average number of alert appearances per paper (within sample) 1.34 - -
Average number of alert appearances per paper (within NEP) 3.90 - -
Table 2: Alert- and Item-Speciﬁc Control Variables
Name Description Mean St. Dev. Min Max
n Number of items in alert (divided by 10) 1.25 0.83 0.40 1.18
ln(av) Number of days alert was available (log) 6.64 0.06 6.54 6.73
engtitle =1 if item has English title 0.99 0.10 0 1
title Number of characters in item title (divided by 100) 0.75 0.28 0.00 2.43
title2 Title variable squared (divided by 10) 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.59
zeroab =1 if item has no abstract 0.02 0.15 0 1
abstract Number of characters in abstract (divided by 1000) 0.97 0.55 0 14.82
authors Number of item authors 2.16 1.11 1 15
zerokey =1 if item has no keywords 0.20 0.40 0 1
keywords Number of item keywords (divided by 10) 0.37 0.28 0 3.20
keywords2 Keywords variable squared 0.21 0.38 0 10.24
zerojel =1 if item has no JEL codes 0.42 0.49 0 1
jel Number of item JEL codes 1.84 1.90 0 13
repstotal Number of lists within NEP in which paper appears 3.90 1.39 2 12
Note: The descriptive statistics are calculated at the relevant alert- or paper-level.
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Table 3: Aggregate Downloads by Position
All Control Treatment
Number of Alerts 530 350 180
Average downloads per item across all positions 5.28 5.35 5.16
Average downloads per item in top position 8.05 8.42 7.33
Average downloads per item in second position 6.49 6.88 5.85
Average downloads per item in second-from-bottom position 4.86 4.78 5.02
Average downloads per item in bottom position 5.99 5.81 6.35
Figure 1: Aggregate Downloads by Position
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Table 4: Estimated Position Eﬀects from Random Eﬀects Estimations
Control Treatment All
i) ii) i) ii) i) ii)
top 0.080 0.076 0.051 0.049 0.079 0.075
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)***
top*treat - - - - -0.023 -0.023
- - - - (0.004)*** (0.004)***
sec 0.053 0.049 0.021 0.018 0.052 0.048
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)***
sec*treat - - - - -0.03 -0.03
- - - - (0.005)*** (0.005)***
secbot 0.008 0.005 0.002 -0.001 0.007 0.003
(0.003)** (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)* (0.003)
secbot*treat - - - - 0.001 0.000
- - - - (0.005) (0.005)
bot 0.031 0.028 0.032 0.029 0.030 0.026
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)***
bot*treat - - - - 0.007 0.006
- - - - (0.005) (0.004)
treat - - - - 0.004 0.004
- - - - (0.002)* (0.002)*
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
User RE - 0.340 - 0.324 - 0.358
- (0.023)*** - (0.028)*** - (0.024)***
Paper RE - 0.093 - 0.000 - 0.000
- (0.021)*** - (0.000) - (0.000)
Obs 189313 189313 99475 99475 288788 288788
Lists 350 350 180 180 530 530
LogLik -67533 -65343 -36004 -35012 -103615 -100081
BIC 135297 135321 72227 72250 207531 207556
LR Tests:
All 4 pos equal 462.7*** 498.9*** 99.9*** 111.0*** - -
Top=Sec 66.9*** 71.8*** 37.4*** 42.7*** - -
Sec=Secbot 153.3*** 165.9*** 13.1*** 13.9*** - -
Secbot=Bot (-) 39.8*** (-) 43.4*** (-) 32.9*** (-) 35.8*** - -
Notes for Table 4: Marginal eﬀects are reported with the standard deviations of the
random eﬀects. (Robust) standard errors are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance is denoted by *
at 5%, ** at 1%, and *** at 0.1%. For comparison, we present two speciﬁcations involving
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i) no random eﬀects, and ii) both the user and paper random eﬀects. The bottom of the
table reports a series of likelihood ratio (LR) tests to assess i) the overall equality of the
estimated position eﬀects, βtop = βsec = βsecbot = βbot, and ii) the equality of `adjacent'
position eﬀects; βtop = βsec, βsec = βsecbot, and βsecbot = βbot.
Technical Notes for Table 4: Interpreting the marginal eﬀects from interacted terms is
diﬃcult within discrete choice models (see Greene 2010, for example). However, i) our
interest is more focused on their sign and signiﬁcance, rather than their exact size, and ii)
our resulting conclusions are robust if we only consider the estimated coeﬃcients instead
(details available on request). Similar arguments also apply to the results of the
estimations in Table 6 and in the Supplementary Appendix. Although the underlying
model is a simple binary probit, the estimation of equation (1) is clearly burdened by the
presence of (potentially several) stochastic elements which need to be integrated out of the
likelihood function. To this end, we have assumed that the elements follow independent
normal distributions with zero means, and with variances that can be freely estimated.
The estimations are then undertaken using simulated maximum likelihood techniques with
500 Halton draws (Train 2003). The results are robust to further increases in the number
of draws.
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Figure 2: Illustration of Estimated Position Eﬀects from RE Estimations
Note: These position eﬀects are derived from the estimated marginal eﬀects in Table 4 for
speciﬁcation (ii).
Table 5: Summary of Users' Random Parameter (RP) Patterns
Control Treatment
Proportion of Users with Highest RP = top 0.81 0.64
Proportion of Users with Strictly Decreasing RPs 0.01 0.01
Proportion of Users with Highest RP = bot 0.03 0.16
Proportion of Users with Strictly Increasing RPs 0.00 0.00
Proportion of Users with Strictly Decreasing RPs (excluding bot) 0.70 0.72
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Table 6: Summary of Download Ordering in Instances of Multiple Downloads
k ≥ 2 k = 2 k ≥ 3 k ≥ 4
Proportion of Instances All Control Treatment All All All
Top-Most Item Downloaded First 0.760 0.759 0.761 0.756 0.764 0.785
Bottom-Most Item Downloaded First 0.181 0.183 0.179 0.244 0.105 0.064
Downloaded in Mono' Order 0.880 0.881 0.879 1.000 0.734 0.698
Downloaded in Mono' Descending Order 0.718 0.717 0.720 0.756 0.672 0.670
Downloaded in Mono' Ascending Order 0.162 0.163 0.158 0.244 0.062 0.028
Items Downloaded in Non-Mono' Order 0.120 0.119 0.121 0.000 0.266 0.302
Number of Instances 6370 4096 2274 3494 2876 1562
Note: Speciﬁcally, these refer to instances where a user downloads k items from an individual list.
Table 7: Summary of Download Ordering for Multiple Download Users
Proportion of Such Users k ≥ 2 k ≥ 3 k ≥ 4
Always Download Top-Most Item First 0.52 0.53 0.56
Always Download Bottom-Most Item First 0.03 0.04 0.00
Always Download Items in a Mono' Order 0.67 0.48 0.42
Always Download Items in a Mono' Order with Same Direction 0.49 0.45 0.40
Always Download Items in a Mono' Descending Order 0.46 0.43 0.40
Always Download Items in a Mono' Ascending Order 0.03 0.02 0.00
Always Download Items in a Non-Mono' Order 0.03 0.14 0.19
Number of Such Users 992 441 233
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Supplementary Appendix
As explained in the main paper, this supplementary appendix provides additional details
on i) the subﬁelds within the sample, ii) an example email alert, iii) the estimated eﬀects
of the control variables, iv) the estimated eﬀects of list length, v) the robustness analysis
using aggregate data, and vi) the random parameter estimations. All associated Tables and
Figures are provided at the end of this appendix.
1.1 An Example Email Alert
nep-cbe
New Economics Papers on Cognitive and Behavioural Economics
Issue of 2017-06-18
six papers chosen by
Marco Novarese
Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale
http://econpapers.repec.org/pno2
________________________________________
1. Nudging in education: A survey
Mette Trier Damgaard; Helena Skyt Nielsen
2. Digestible information: The impact of Multiple Traﬃc Light nutritional labeling in a developing
country
Defago, Daniel; Geng, José F.; Molina, Oswaldo; Santa María, Diego
3. Facing Yourself: A Note on Self-image
Armin Falk
4. Essays on behavioral ﬁnance
Terzi, Ayse
5. Revealing the Economic Consequences of Group Cohesion
Simon Gaechter; Chris Starmer; Fabio Tufano
6. The Merit Primacy Eﬀect
36
Alexander Cappelen; Karl Ove Moene; Siv-Elisabeth Skjelbred; Bertil Tungodden
________________________________________
1. Nudging in education: A survey
Date: 2017-06-08
By: Mette Trier Damgaard (Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus Univer-
sity, Denmark) ; Helena Skyt Nielsen (Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus
University, Denmark)
Can we nudge children, youths and their parents to make better educational decisions? Educational
decisions involve immediate costs and potential future beneﬁts. Research suggests that in such
settings behavioral barriers (such as lack of self-control, limited attention and social norms) are
likely to inﬂuence choices. This raises the question whether low cost nudges can improve people's
educational choices. While interventions targeting cognitive or attentional limitations seem to be
eﬀective, it is too soon to provide a roadmap for introducing nudges in the education sector.
Keywords: Behavioural bias, boost policies, education choice, human capital investment
JEL: D03 D04 I20
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aah:aarhec:2017-05&r=cbe
The remaining items 2-6 are then presented in a similar format.
1.2 List of Subﬁelds Within the Sample
The 29 subﬁelds within the sample are: Africa, Ageing, Agricultural, Cognitive and Be-
havioural, Collective Decision Making, Computational Economics, Dynamic General Equi-
librium, Education, Eﬃciency and Productivity, Time Series, Experimental, Forecasting,
Happiness, Health, History and Philosophy, Human Capital, International Trade, Intellectual
Property, Knowledge Management, Microﬁnance, Microeconomics, Migration, Marketing,
Monetary, Post Keynesian, Project and Portfolio Management, Risk Management, Sports,
and Transition.
1.3 The Eﬀects of the Control Variables
Here we report the estimated eﬀects of the control variables from the random eﬀects es-
timations within Section 4.1.2. Table 10 below presents the estimated marginal eﬀects of
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the control variables, corresponding to the estimations from Table 4. The results are best
interpreted within the treatment group. Per-item downloads decrease in lists which have a
larger number of items - see Section 1.4 below for more on the eﬀects of list length. Items
with an English title are more likely to be downloaded, and the probability of download is
U-shaped in an item's length of title. The length of abstract provides no eﬀect, but items
with no abstract have a higher download probability. Items with a higher number of authors
are less likely to be downloaded. Items with more keywords have a slightly higher down-
load probability, and items without any JEL codes are less likely to be downloaded. Lastly,
the probability of download is mildly increasing in the number of lists in which the item's
underlying paper appears, perhaps reﬂecting the paper's general appeal.
1.4 The Eﬀects of List Length
This section reports the full results of the estimated eﬀects of list length referred to in
Section 4.1.2. Speciﬁcally, we brieﬂy study how our random eﬀects estimatations vary with
the number of items contained within an alert or `list'. To proceed, we re-estimate equation
(1) with an additional set of interaction terms, Π′ ∗ nl, to measure how each position eﬀect
varies with list length, nl.
The results are reported in Table 11. Within the control group, the four position eﬀects
are all signiﬁcantly decreasing in list length. Intuitively, as the number of items increases,
position eﬀects become weaker because users' download activity is spread over more positions.
However, within the treatment group, while we continue to observe a similar pattern for most
positions, the estimated top position eﬀects do not signiﬁcantly decrease. Instead, with a
weak level of signiﬁcance, the top position eﬀects actually increase and become relatively
more pronounced. This pattern is even stronger in our analysis of the aggregate data, and
related ﬁndings have also been documented by Ho and Imai (2008) and Feenberg et al.
(2017).
While this is an interesting result with important implications, we are careful to not
place too much emphasis on it for two reasons. First, variations in list length are unlikely
to be fully exogenous. For instance, in our setting, list length varies due to diﬀerences in
the supply of academic papers over time and across subﬁelds, and may be correlated with
variations in the quality of papers. Second, a pattern of increasing top position eﬀects does
not help distinguish between the explanations.
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1.5 Robustness Analysis with Aggregate Data
This subsection shows how the dis-aggregated user-level results from Section 4.1.2 are robust
under an alternative aggregate approach which considers how an item's list position aﬀects
the total number of downloads it receives.
Mirroring the user-level estimation in (1), the total downloads received by the item in
position p of list l, dpl, is modeled as a function of the position dummies, Π, the list-speciﬁc
control variables, zl, and the item-speciﬁc control variables, qpl:
β0 + Π
′βΠ + z′lβz + q
′
plβq (3)
Any such estimation needs to take account of two features of the aggregate data. First,
item downloads can only take the form of a non-negative integer, dpl ∈ {0, 1, 2...}. Rather
than using a negative binomial model, which is argued to be less robust, we address this issue
by using a quasi-maximum likelihood estimator based on the Poisson distribution (Poisson
QMLE).19 Second, to account for the fact that some papers are included on the lists of more
than one subﬁeld, we cluster the standard errors by paper. This allows the error terms
of observations with the same underlying paper to have a correlated error structure, while
maintaining the assumption of independent errors for observations with diﬀerent underlying
papers. Similar to before, after estimating (3) on the control and treatment groups separately,
we also estimate (3) on the full sample with the addition of treatl and the interacted position
eﬀects, Π′ ∗ treatl.
Table 8 (below) presents the results with similar conclusions to the main user-level analy-
sis. First, items in the top position within the treatment group still receive signiﬁcantly more
downloads than average despite the randomization of item order. In particular, items in the
top position receive 36-52% more downloads than average. Second, smaller, yet signiﬁcant,
eﬀects still exist for items in second position and bottom position, even after randomiza-
tion. Third, bottom position eﬀects are still signiﬁcantly larger than the eﬀects from the
preceding, second-from-bottom, position.20
1.6 Full Random Parameter Results
This section provides the full random parameter estimation results from Section 4.2.1. Below
19See Wooldridge (1999) for more details on the Poisson QMLE and its relative advantages. Unless
otherwise stated, all our main results can also be replicated using the negative binomial model.
20The Wald tests reported at the bottom of the table assess i) the overall equality of the estimated
position eﬀects, βtop = βsec = βsecbot = βbot, and ii) the equality of `adjacent' position eﬀects; βtop = βsec,
βsec = βsecbot, and βsecbot = βbot.
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in Table 12 we present the results. For each estimation, we report the marginal eﬀects of
the main variables, together with the estimated standard deviations of the random param-
eters. All (robust) standard errors are presented in parentheses. While the overall results
are consistent with the previous random eﬀects estimations, the random parameter results
document a substantial heterogeneity in position eﬀects across users. This is illustrated fur-
ther below in Figure 3 where the estimated random parameters are recovered following the
method by Train (2009) and presented graphically.
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Table 8: Estimated Position Eﬀects with Aggregate Data
Control Treatment All
i) ii) i) ii) i) ii)
top 3.768 2.976 2.724 1.915 3.731 2.872
(0.378)*** (0.337)*** (0.507)*** (0.444)*** (0.374)*** (0.332)***
top*treat - - - - -0.589 -0.490
- - - - (0.378) (0.364)
sec 2.143 1.658 1.195 0.537 2.120 1.588
(0.350)*** (0.319)*** (0.461)** (0.382) (0.346)*** (0.314)***
sec*treat - - - - -0.666 -0.690
- - - - (0.413) (0.378)
secbot -0.035 -0.418 0.319 -0.240 -0.035 -0.451
(0.287) (0.256) (0.392) (0.331) (0.284) (0.253)
secbot*treat - - - - 0.364 0.372
- - - - (0.508) (0.478)
bot 1.076 0.683 1.716 0.989 1.064 0.627
(0.398)** (0.351) (0.427)*** (0.358)** (0.393)** (0.344)
bot*treat - - - - 0.586 0.505
- - - - (0.526) (0.479)
treat - - - - -0.098 0.092
- - - - (0.157) (0.152)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 4268 4268 2355 2355 6623 6623
Lists 350 350 180 180 530 530
Clusters 3317 3317 1895 1895 4942 4942
LogLik -14800 -14100 -7910 -7525 -22700 -21700
BIC 29663 28430 15859 15197 45529 43679
σˆ2 4.69 4.07 4.29 3.68 4.55 3.96
Wald Tests:
All 4 pos equal 79.9*** 79.3*** 16.5*** 18.8*** - -
Top=Sec 11.4*** 9.31** 5.45* 6.30* - -
Sec=Secbot 27.1*** 30.5 2.37 2.73 - -
Secbot=Bot (-) 5.71* (-) 7.25** (-) 6.31* (-) 7.05* - -
Note: Marginal eﬀects are reported with (robust) standard deviations in parentheses. Signiﬁcance is
denoted by * at 5%, ** at 1%, and *** at 0.1%. We present two speciﬁcations with and without the
list-speciﬁc and item-speciﬁc controls. The marginal eﬀects of the controls are omitted for brevity.
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Table 9: Estimated Eﬀect of List Length on Position Eﬀects with Aggregate Data
Control Treatment
i) ii) i) ii)
top 2.029 1.892 -0.028 0.133
(0.482)*** (0.463)*** (0.647) (0.616)
top*n 0.060 0.061 0.135 0.116
(0.020)** (0.020)** (0.041)** (0.036)**
sec 0.652 0.743 0.562 0.679
(0.469) (0.461) (1.086) (1.037)
sec*n 0.064 0.060 0.002 -0.013
(0.029)* (0.028)* (0.063) (0.059)
secbot -0.470 -0.329 0.475 0.375
(0.475) (0.478) (0.938) (0.861)
secbot*n 0.001 -0.012 -0.055 -0.053
(0.032) (0.031) (0.059) (0.056)
bot 0.119 0.280 1.234 1.054
(0.460) (0.441) (0.813) (0.782)
bot*n 0.036 0.028 -0.012 -0.007
(0.029) (0.028) (0.044) (0.045)
n -0.055 -0.050 -0.098 -0.072
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.014)*** (0.013)***
Controls No Yes No Yes
Obs 4268 4268 2355 2355
Lists 350 350 180 180
Clusters 3317 3317 1895 1895
LogLik -14600 -14100 -7758 -7505
BIC 29256 28412 15594 15189
σˆ2 4.52 4.06 4.04 3.67
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Table 10: Estimated Eﬀects of Control Variables from Random Eﬀects Estimations
Control Treatment All
i) ii) i) ii) i) ii)
n -0.021 -0.019 -0.036 -0.034 -0.024 -0.022
(0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.003)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)***
ln(av) -0.015 0.005 -0.143 -0.117 0.003 -0.006
(0.011) (0.018) (0.040)*** (0.052)* (0.009) (0.015)
engtitle 0.077 0.075 0.102 0.096 0.083 0.082
(0.009)*** (0.011)*** (0.016)*** (0.017)*** (0.008)*** (0.009)***
title -0.052 -0.066 -0.093 -0.094 -0.068 -0.077
(0.009)*** (0.010)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)***
title2 0.098 0.170 0.327 0.318 0.192 0.231
(0.057) (0.059)** (0.081)*** (0.080)*** (0.045)*** (0.046)***
zeroab 0.037 0.039 0.036 0.034 0.036 0.037
(0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)***
abstract -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
authors -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
zerokey 0.017 0.018 0.009 0.012 0.014 0.016
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)* (0.005)* (0.003)*** (0.003)***
keywords 0.023 0.020 -0.015 -0.013 0.011 0.009
(0.008)** (0.008)* (0.010) (0.011) (0.006) (0.007)
keywords2 -0.006 -0.005 0.016 0.014 0.000 0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006)* (0.006)* (0.003) (0.004)
zerojel -0.001 -0.005 -0.006 -0.010 -0.002 -0.007
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)* 0.002 (0.002)**
jel -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
(0.001)* (0.001)** (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)* (0.001)**
repstotal -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001
(0.001)* (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)** (0.000) (0.001)
Note: Marginal eﬀects are reported for the main variables, with the standard deviations of
the random eﬀects. (Robust) standard errors are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance is denoted by
* at 5%, ** at 1%, and *** at 0.1%.
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Table 11: Estimated Eﬀect of List Length on Position Eﬀects
Control Treatment
i) ii) i) ii)
top 0.137 0.122 0.056 0.044
(0.007)*** (0.008)*** (0.009)*** (0.008)***
top*n -0.035 -0.026 0.001 0.007
(0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.006) (0.005)
sec 0.094 0.080 0.063 0.049
(0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.010)*** (0.009)***
sec*n -0.027 -0.019 -0.028 -0.021
(0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)**
secbot 0.075 0.063 0.064 0.048
(0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)***
secbot*n -0.046 -0.039 -0.043 -0.033
(0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.007)***
bot 0.095 0.082 0.084 0.069
(0.007)*** (0.006)*** (0.010)*** (0.009)***
bot*n -0.042 -0.035 -0.036 -0.027
(0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.007)*** (0.006)***
n -0.018 -0.016 -0.032 -0.032
(0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)***
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
User-level RE No Yes No Yes
Paper-level RE No Yes No Yes
Obs 189313 189313 99475 99475
Lists 350 350 180 180
LogLik -68514.8 -66423.5 -36216 -35198
BIC 137309.3 137334 72698 72721
Note: Marginal eﬀects are reported with (robust) standard deviations in parentheses. Test
signiﬁcance is denoted by * at 5%, ** at 1%, and *** at 0.1%.
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Table 12: Estimated Position Eﬀects from Random Parameter (RP) Estimations
Control Treatment
top 0.068 0.035
(0.003)*** (0.006)***
sec 0.034 -0.001
(0.004)*** (0.008)
secbot -0.011 -0.019
(0.005)* (0.007)*
bot 0.017 0.017
(0.004)*** (0.006)**
Full Controls Y Y
User-level RPs:
top 0.377 0.410
(0.038)*** (0.054)***
sec 0.420 0.451
(0.038)*** (0.072)***
secbot 0.406 0.433
(0.047)*** (0.062)***
bot 0.388 0.379
(0.043)*** (0.057)***
Observations 189313 99475
Lists 350 180
LogLik -67343 -35917
BIC 134954 72087
Note: Marginal eﬀects are reported for the main variables, together with the estimated
standard deviations of the (user-level) random parameters. All (robust) standard errors are
presented in parentheses. Signiﬁcance is denoted by * at 5%, ** at 1%, and *** at 0.1%.
Like the random eﬀects estimations, these augmented probit equations are estimated using
simulated maximum likelihood techniques and Halton draws.
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Figure 3: Estimated Random Parameter Distributions
Note: These distributions correspond to the random parameter estimations for each
position eﬀect in the previous table, Table 12. The graph on the left corresponds to the
control group and the graph on the right corresponds to the treatment group.
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